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Abstract 
This paper presents results of an experiment testing how the personality dimension 
agreeableness interacts with different organizational factors to affect the strategy chosen when 
entering a budget negotiation.  Prior budget research suggests firms invite subordinates into 
budget negotiations primarily to elicit private information from subordinate managers.  However, 
criticism of traditional budgeting processes suggests subordinates will act strategically in such 
negotiations, limiting the effectiveness of inviting managers into budget negotiations.  This study 
hypothesizes the factors most criticized, including budget targets in performance evaluation, will 
interact with certain organizational factors, connectedness of organizational units, and an 
individual personality dimension to significantly affect the amount of information managers 
share through the choice of negotiation strategy.  Results indicate such interaction may impact 
how and to what extent information is shared in the budget negotiation, suggesting important 
implications for how budget managers approach budget negotiations. 
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Introduction 
While budgeting generally, and subordinate involvement in budget preparation in 
particular, have been one of the most researched topics in management accounting (Shields and 
Shields 1998), the area remains largely unsettled (Derfuss 2016).  In particular, how and to what 
extent factors related to the budget development process address the fundamental agency 
problem of eliciting private information from subordinate mangers (agents) remains unresolved 
(Brown, Evans Iii, and Moser 2009).  Eliciting such information to better manage organizational 
planning is a fundamental reason firms invite participation in the budgeting process (Shields and 
Shields 1998).  However, critics, most notably the Beyond Budgeting Roundtable, argue 
traditional budgeting practices incentivize participating mangers to use their private information 
strategically for personal advantage, harming firm efficiency and profitability (Libby and 
Lindsay 2010).  Given this, adding to the understanding of factors influencing such information 
sharing would significantly contribute to both academia and practice. 
This paper reports the results of an experiment exploring how personality affects 
subordinate response to two structural factors around the budget negotiation process:  the degree 
of budget focus in performance evaluation and the level of interdependence between 
organizational units.  An interaction between these factors and the personality dimension 
agreeableness, part of the “Big Five” personality framework, affecting the intention of pursuing 
integrative negotiation strategies is hypothesized.   
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Integrative strategies approach negotiation with a “win-win” perspective. They require 
the negotiator to more openly provide private information to achieve optimally beneficial 
negotiation outcomes for all parties.  Generally integrative strategies produce better overall 
outcomes, but are used less often than distributive strategies, which approach negotiation as a 
win/lose proposition, due to the greater effort and trust required of integrative strategies 
(McCracken, Salterio, and Schmidt 2011; Neale and Bazerman 1985).   
Since a primary reason firms involve subordinate managers in the budgeting process is 
for those managers to provide information to better coordinate firm interdependencies (Shields 
and Shields 1998), the implicit goal of initiating budget negotiations is to prompt the utilization 
of integrative negotiation strategies.  Use of integrative negotiation strategies increases the flow 
of information during the budgeting process, resulting in improved firm planning and control.  
Therefore, factors which affect the intention to utilize integrative negotiation strategies during 
budget negotiations should be of ample interest to the accounting discipline. 
 Results of the experiment indicate a moderating relationship between the personality 
dimension agreeableness and the aforementioned structural factors impacting the intent to utilize 
an integrative negotiation strategy.  Certain combinations correlate with a reduced intent, while 
others correlate with a greater intent.  Such insights aid practitioners in better approaching 
budget negotiations to advance planning and control, and advance the academy’s understanding 
of the budgeting process. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  A review of relevant literature related to 
budget negotiation and personality along with research hypotheses is presented in the section 
“Theory and Hypotheses.”  The section “Methodology” then describes the experiment 
performed.  Results and hypotheses tests are presented in the section “Results.” Implications and 
limitations of the experiment are presented in the section “Discussion and Limitations.” 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Budget Negotiation 
Budgets routinely function as a central component of planning and control systems 
(Arnold and Gillenkirch 2015; Covaleski, Evans Iii, Luft, and Shields 2003). However, the use 
of budgets for both planning and control purposes creates conflicting pressures and incentives 
within organizations (Libby and Lindsay 2010). Planning functions require an open exchange of 
information to develop accurate forecasts and optimally coordinate organizational 
interdependencies.  Control, particularly performance evaluation, incentivizes less open 
exchange.  Subordinates held accountable for performance against a budget target may attempt to 
obtain easier targets by sharing, or witholding, information strategically (Libby and Lindsay 
2010). 
Of particular concern in budgeting research has been how the structure of the budgeting 
process affects the sharing of information from subordinate to superior.  Agency theory posits 
that subordinates will use the information assymetry created by the presence of subordinate 
private information to obtain favorable performance contracts.  Given this, superiors utilize the 
budget contract and budget setting process to incentivize the subordinate to share private 
information. More complete and accurate information improves organizational planning, and 
enables managers to craft optimal incentives for performance evaluation and control. (Brown et 
al. 2009; Derfuss 2016; Sprinkle, Williamson, and Upton 2008). 
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In practice, the process of engaging subordinates and crafting a budget is conducted 
through negotiation (Fisher, Frederickson, and Peffer 2000).  Recent budget negotiation research 
has suggested subordinates do act strategically within the negoticaion process (Fisher, Peffer, 
Sprinkle, and Williamson 2015); however, subordinates routinely do not claim as much slack as 
possible in budget negotiations (Brown et al. 2009).  Understanding the factors which drive how 
and to what extent subordinates share private information remains a largely underdeveloped area 
of management accounting research. 
 
Negotiation Strategy 
While budget negotiation research has suggested subordinates act strategically in their 
negotiations (Fisher et al. 2015), this line of research primarily focusses on whether negotiations 
end in agreement, or assignment of a budget by the superior (Fisher et al. 2000; Fisher, 
Frederickson, and Peffer 2006; Fisher, Maines, Peffer, and Sprinkle 2002).  This approach fails 
to consider the myriad components which comprise the negotiation process.  Such factors can 
affect a negotiator’s willingness to share information.   
Specifically, the negotiation strategy a participant chooses will guide whether 
information is shared freely or shared strategically to gain an advantage.  Negotiation strategies 
fall into two broad classifications:  integrative or distributive.  When pursuing an integrative 
negotiation strategy, a negotiator attempts to find an outcome where all parties get as much of 
what they desire from the negotiation as possible.  In contrast, a negotiator pursuing a 
distributive negotiation strategy tends to view the interaction through a framework where any 
gain for the other party results in reduced outcome for themselves.  The strategy a negotiator 
chooses will have a substantial impact on how he shares information, and has been consistently 
shown to significantly impact the ultimate negotiation outcome (Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007; 
Gibbins, McCracken, and Salterio 2010; McCracken et al. 2011; Neale and Bazerman 1985). 
Typically, negotiators default to pursuing distributive negotiation strategies.  Such 
strategies are appropriate for many typical negotiation situations, such as haggling over a price.  
Moreover, such strategies require less cognitive effort, viewing the negotiation as a fixed set of 
factors, and only require the negotiator consider their own outcome (Neale and Bazerman 1985; 
Thompson 2000).   
Primary tactics utilized by negotiators pursuing a distributive strategy include 
contending, compromising, and conceding.  Contending tactics attempt to aggressively assert 
claim to as much of the negotiation set as possible and force concessions from the other party.  
Making a low offer price when negotiating the purchase price of a car would be a contending 
tactic.  Compromising strategies attempt to find a middle ground between the parties.  “Split-the-
difference” type strategies would fall in this classification, where the parties each make some 
concessions to find an agreeable resolution.  Lastly, conceding strategies involve making a 
strategic concession from one’s position to benefit the other party.  Such strategies reduce the 
negotiators claim on the negotiation area, but the concession can prompt concessions from the 
other party, moving the negotiation toward an agreement.  For instance, a car salesman might 
offer a longer loan term, prompting the buyer to accept a higher purchase price (Esser and 
Komorita 1975; McCracken et al. 2011; Thompson 2000). 
In contrast, negotiators pursuing an integrative negotiation strategy view the area of 
possible agreement as flexible.  Most commonly these strategies involve expanding the agenda 
and/or problem solving.  Expanding the agenda strategies involve bringing more issues into the 
negotiation area, allowing parties to make beneficial trade-offs.  This allows parties to make 
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concessions on issues of low importance to them, but which hold greater importance to other 
parties.  For instance, a car salesman might offer free carwashes and coupons for a percent off 
service work with the car purchase.  By bringing factors beyond the price and loan terms into the 
negotiation, each side can obtain more of what they desire in the negotiation outcome while 
conceding areas of less importance to them.  Problem solving strategies involve the parties 
finding alternative routes to each negotiator’s desired outcome.  This strategy, like expanding the 
agenda, involves finding win-win trade-offs.  However, instead of increasing the negotiation area 
negotiators look more intently at the possible trade-offs to find areas which the parties value 
differently.  In the car purchase example a salesman pursuing a problem solving strategy would 
first seek to fully understand the car purchaser’s circumstance and needs, and then seek to find a 
way to meet those while generating the required profit (Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007; 
McCracken et al. 2011; Thompson 2000). 
Accountants tasked with negotiating budgets for their organization have substantial 
interest in the negotiation strategies employed.  If negotiation partners pursue an integrative 
negotiation strategy more information will be offered, improving planning and control, and 
allowing more optimal performance incentives to be developed.  However, budget negotiations 
contain unique features which could affect the negotiation strategies chosen.  Budget 
negotiations conclude with performance goals for which parties are responsible (budget targets) 
instead of a transaction (like the purchase of a car).   Even more, the subordinate party will 
typically be held accountable for meeting the agreed-upon target.  As budget critics contend, 
such accountability incentivizes budget negotiators to act strategically and claim as much benefit 
as possible (Libby and Lindsay 2010). 
The outcomes of budget negotiations may also impact other units in the firm beyond 
those of the negotiating parties.  The realization that an agreement impacts other parties would be 
expected to prompt greater consideration of the affected parties.  Such realization may affect 
how parties approach the negotiation.  In circumstances with greater interdependence, where the 
outcome of a negotiation has impact beyond the immediate negotiator, the knowledge of that 
greater span of impact would be expected to induce greater use of integrative negotiation 
strategies and less use of distributive strategies (DeRue, Conlon, Moon, and Willaby 2009; Pruitt 
1983).  In contrast, circumstances with lower interdependence, where the negotiation outcome 
only affects the immediate participants, would likely incentivize use of more distributive 
negotiation strategies.  For example, in a budget negotiation a business unit manager who only 
sees his unit’s interests would be expected to claim as many resources as possible to improve his 
unit’s position.  Any gain surrendered worsens the unit’s position without any obvious benefit, 
thus the utilization of distributive strategies to approach the negotiation as a win-lose exercise is 
the most logical choice. 
However, in a budget negotiation with greater interdependence between business units, a 
business unit manager may well see the interaction differently.  In such a circumstance the 
manager is aware that the outcome of the negotiation will impact other parties not directly 
involved in the interaction.  The outcome could inform planning for stages of production after 
his.  Alternatively, excess resources claimed by his unit could restrict the availability of 
resources for other units.  The realization of other stakeholders whose well-being is impacted by 
the outcome of the unit manager’s negotiation logically changes the strategy selection.  The 
unit’s well-being remains a central concern, but the impact of the negotiation outcome on other 
stakeholders’ well-being factors into strategy selection as well. 
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Additionally, individual differences between negotiators may impact how these structural 
factors affect negotiation strategy selection.  Ultimately negotiation and the choice of negotiation 
strategy is a behavioral choice.  Certain personalities are driven more strongly by reward.  Other 
personalities gravitate toward supporting others more naturally (Goldberg 1990; Judge 2002).  
The particular configuration of an individual’s personality would be expected to affect the type 
of negotiation strategy to which they gravitate and are ultimately most comfortable pursuing in a 
given situation (Dimotakis, Conlon, and Ilies 2012). 
 
Personality and Negotiation 
Increasingly, the generic negotiation literature has returned to the notion negotiation is an 
inherently behavioral endeavor, and individual differences (personality) affect how a person 
approaches the interaction (Dimotakis et al. 2012; Sharma, Bottom, and Elfenbein 2013).  In this 
line of research personality factors typically function as an intervening variable moderating the 
impact of other variables influencing an individual’s approach to negotiation.  One particular 
personality dimension which has been shown to influence negotiation behaviors in the generic 
negotiation literature has been “agreeableness” (Dimotakis et al. 2012). 
Agreeableness is one of the personality dimensions articulated in the “Big 5” model of 
personality (Goldberg 1981, 1990).  While numerous models of personality have been 
propagated in academic research, the “Big 5” has ascended as a broadly accepted model of 
personality (Digman 1990).  The “Big 5” posits that all individual differences can be categorized 
into five broad dimensions of personality:  extraversion, conscientiousness, neuroticism, 
agreeableness, and openness to experience (McCrae and Costa 1985). 
Within the Big 5 framework every individual possesses some measure of all five 
dimensions.  However, an individual’s typical behaviors will reflect the dimension(s) the 
individual possesses most prominently (DeYoung, Quilty, and Peterson 2007).  Thus, someone 
characterized as highly agreeable would possess some measure of the other four dimensions:  
conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience, but rate higher on the 
agreeableness dimension than the other four and predominantly demonstrate behaviors 
associated with this dimension. 
Highly agreeable individuals tend to demonstrate substantial care for others along with a 
distinct disdain for conflict.  Typical descriptors attached to highly agreeable individuals include:  
kind, caring, altruistic, tender, compassionate, cooperative, compliant, and meek.  Highly 
agreeable individuals gravitate toward supporting others and prefer to avoid interpersonal 
conflict (Barrick, Mount, and Judge 2001; DeYoung et al. 2007; Goldberg 1992; Judge 2002; 
Judge, Simon, Hurst, and Kelley 2013). 
Organizational behavior research suggests personality dimensions act as behavioral 
preferences which are activated by environmental opportunities (called “trait activation” in the 
literature) (Barrick et al. 2001; Barrick and Mount 1991, 2005).  Trait activation occurs in 
moderately strong circumstances, when an interaction is salient enough to warrant a response, 
but not so intense the circumstance demands a particular response.  Such circumstances allow for 
the expression of greater individuality and the exercising of individual preference (Dimotakis et 
al. 2012).   
As stated earlier, the dimension of agreeableness has been shown to have moderating 
impacts in negotiation strategy selection and outcome (Dimotakis et al. 2012; Sharma et al. 
2013).  Highly agreeable individuals tend to be very sympathetic to others, altruistic, meek, and 
generally relationship oriented (Digman 1990; Goldberg 1990; McCrae and Costa 1985).  
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Generic negotiation research has shown agreeable individuals to generate lower outcomes in 
more competitive, distributive negotiations.  Conversely, the natural other-focus of agreeable 
individuals would tend to be an asset in more integrative negotiations (Dimotakis et al. 2012; 
Sharma et al. 2013). 
The unique characteristics of budget negotiation may prompt agreeableness trait 
activation and affect how highly agreeable individuals approach a budget negotiation.  Generic 
negotiation research suggests accountability for results can create the necessary salience within a 
negotiation to prompt trait activation (Pruitt 1983). Second, greater interdependence within an 
organization would likely activate an agreeable individual’s other-focused tendencies (Pruitt 
1983). 
Thus, one would expect agreeable individuals to be more likely to pursue other-focused 
integrative negotiation strategies in highly interdependent organizations; although, a budget 
focused performance evaluation may be necessary to make the budget negotiation sufficiently 
salient to evoke such differences.  However, agreeable individuals’ other-focused tendencies 
may also work against prompting some integrative negotiation strategies.  While a problem-
solving negotiation strategy points toward cooperation and collaboration, an expand-the-agenda 
type strategy requires greater assertiveness and potentially requires challenging one’s negotiation 
counterpart to consider options outside the initial negotiation set.  Such assertiveness would 
likely prove uncomfortable for highly agreeable individuals, particularly when the counterpart is 
an authority figure. Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated (stated in alternate form): 
 
H1:  Highly agreeable individuals will be significantly less likely than other individuals 
to pursue an expand-the-agenda negotiation strategy in a highly interdependent circumstance. 
 
H2:  Highly agreeable individuals will be significantly less likely than other individuals 
to pursue an expand-the-agenda negotiation strategy in a highly interdependent circumstance 
with high accountability. 
 
H3:  Highly agreeable individuals will be significantly more likely than other individuals 
to pursue a problem solving strategy in a highly interdependent circumstance. 
 
H4:  Highly agreeable individuals will be significantly more likely than other individuals 
to pursue a problem solving strategy in a highly interdependent circumstance with high 
accountability. 
 
Methodology 
Setting 
 This study examines a setting in which a business unit manager must prepare for an 
upcoming budget negotiation with senior management.  Specifically, participants adopted the 
role of unit manager of a regional lawn care service company.  The lawn care industry was 
chosen because it should be generally relatable to the majority of participants and added a layer 
of richness to make the case more realistic and engaging for participants.  
 
Participants 
 The case study and survey questionnaires were initially pilot tested with undergraduate 
business students.  Pilot test results showed effective experimental manipulations and 
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questionnaire delivery.  Students received extra credit in an accounting class for participating in 
the pilot test. 
 Participants for the experiment were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
crowdsourcing marketplace.  Recent research suggests participants recruited through a service 
like Amazon’s MTurk marketplace are at least as good a proxy for the general working populace 
as students, and possibly better (Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and Stinson 2018). An MTurk task 
was submitted requesting 100 observations.  Participants responding to the task were linked to on 
online survey.  Participants read one of four scenario manipulations and then answered questions 
about their likelihood to use various negotiation strategies in the upcoming budget negotiation. 
 Of the 100 responses solicited, 94 usable responses were obtained.  The 6 unused 
responses all failed to complete significant portions of the experimental questionnaires and/or 
significantly failed manipulation checks.  Participants who successfully completed all 
components of the questionnaire received a code to input in the MTurk system to receive 
compensation for completing the task. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of four case manipulations.  Interdependence 
and budgetary performance evaluation focus (accountability) were each manipulated at two 
levels (high and low) creating a 2 X 2 fully crossed experimental design.  In the high 
interdependence manipulation individual units were supported by shared services for a variety of 
specialty work requiring specific skills, often requiring licenses, and/or specialty equipment.  
The case highlighted that the quantity of such resources was limited and if a unit planned for 
greater quantities than necessary access to these resources would be limited to other units.  In the 
low interdependence manipulation such specialty services were acquired by each unit contracting 
with specialty providers and the unit was responsible for correctly forecasting and managing its 
use of such services.  In the high budget performance evaluation focus the firm measures several 
factors for performance evaluation of unit managers, but considers meeting budget targets the 
primary responsibility of unit managers.  In the low budget performance evaluation manipulation 
meeting budget targets is one of several measures used to assess unit managers, but is not 
considered more significant than other measures. 
 After reading the case scenario participants indicated how likely they would be to use a 
series of negotiation strategies.  Each strategy statement was accompanied with a 5-point Likert 
scale anchored with “Very Unlikely” and “Very Likely.”  Participants indicated their likelihood 
of using a particular strategy by selecting the point which best fit their intentions.  The strategy 
options were adapted from Gibbins, McCracken, and Salterio (2010).  This instrument is drawn 
from a long established and validated inventory of negotiation strategies (Goodwin 2002; 
Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders 2010; Rahim 1983; Rahim and Magner 1995).  Minimal editing 
was performed to fit the particulars of this case.  Editing did not change essential wording, but 
did alter specific names to fit the scenario presented. 
 The instrument consists of 25 statements reflecting five negotiation strategies.  Two 
strategies reflect integrative approaches:  expand the agenda and problem solving.  The other 
three strategies reflect distributive approaches:  contend, concede, and compromise.  Although 
the distributive strategies are not considered in the hypotheses postulated, data was collected 
regarding them.  The ten statements from the instrument reflecting the two integrative strategies 
of interest in this study follow. 
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Statements used to assess Expand the Agenda negotiation strategy intention were: 
− I would attempt to bring additional issues to the discussion, such that I could trade off on 
these issues to resolve this issue in my favor 
− I would attempt to find other issues with management, so I could accede to their wishes 
at the same time as achieving my position on this issue 
− I would provide all relevant information to management so we could solve this issue 
together in the context of other issues 
− I would attempt to find other issues with management, which would add to the discussion 
− I would try to work with management to develop a proper understanding of this issue in 
the context of other issues 
 
Statements used to assess Problem Solving negotiation strategy intention were: 
− I would collaborate with management to come up with a new solution acceptable to both 
of us 
− I would try to work with corporate management to find new solutions to this issue that 
satisfy both our expectations 
− I would try to investigate the issue further with corporate management to find a new 
solution acceptable to both of us 
− I would try to bring all my concerns about this issue out into the open with management 
so that the issue could be resolved in the best possible way 
− I would try to integrate my ideas about how to resolve this issue with corporate 
management to come up with a new solution jointly 
 
 After completing the negotiation strategy assessment participants completed a short 
manipulation check of the experimental manipulations and then asked to respond to a 100-item 
personality assessment adapted from DeYoung et al (2007).  The 100 items consisted of 
individual statements describing specific characteristics.  Participants were asked to rate how 
well each statement described themselves.  No changes in wording were made.  Participants 
responded on a five-point Likert scale, as with prior experimental questions.  The scale was 
anchored with “Very Inaccurate” and “Very Accurate.”  The twenty statements relating to the 
agreeableness personality dimension adapted from DeYoung et al. (2007) are: 
 
− Am not interested in other people’s problems (reverse coded) 
− Feel others’ emotions 
− Inquire about others’ well-being 
− Can’t be bothered with other’s needs (reverse coded) 
− Sympathize with others’ feelings 
− Am indifferent to the feelings of others (reverse coded) 
− Take no time for others (reverse coded) 
− Take an interest in other people’s lives 
− Don’t have a soft side (reverse coded) 
− Like to do things for others 
− Respect authority 
− Insult people (reverse coded) 
− Hate to seem pushy 
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− Believe that I am better than others (reverse coded) 
− Avoid imposing my will on others 
− Rarely put people under pressure 
− Take advantage of others 
− Seek conflict (reverse coded) 
− Love a good fight (reverse coded) 
− Am out for my own personal gain (reverse coded) 
 
Finally, demographic and work experience data was collected.  Participants then received a code 
which they provided in the Amazon MTurk system to receive compensation. 
 
Analysis and Measures 
 Hypotheses for this study are assessed performing a 2X2X2 ANOVA.  Organizational 
interdependence (Interdep) was manipulated at HIGH (1) and LOW (0) levels.  Similarly, budget 
performance evaluation (PerfEval) focus was also manipulated at HIGH (1) and LOW (0) levels.  
Agreeableness was measured with 20 statements assessed on a 5-point Likert scale.  Initial 
assessment of the Agreeableness variable indicated some deviation from normality. Rather than 
perform a transformation, since the hypotheses lent themselves to analysis with an ANOVA, a 
median split was performed transforming the responses into a categorical variable (AGRSPL) 
with HIGH (1) and LOW (0) classifications.  To code the median split all observations were 
sorted by the value of the Agreeableness variable (high to low), the half of observations with the 
highest scores were assigned to the HIGH (1) coding and the remaining observations, the half 
with the lowest values on the Agreeableness variable were coded to the LOW (0) classification.  
Thus, the strength of the Agreeableness dimension of all 94 usable responses was assessed.  The 
half showing the strongest intensity were coded as HIGH, and the half of responses showing 
lower strength were coded LOW.  ANOVA analysis also requires homogeneity of variance, 
normality, and independence of observations.  No violations of these requirements were 
observed. 
 Separate ANOVAs were run for each of the two integrative strategies tested:  expand the 
agenda and problem solving.  Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics and ANOVA results 
with the expand the agenda strategy as a dependent variable.  Tables 3 and 4 report the 
descriptive statistics and ANOVA results with the problem solving strategy as the dependent 
variable. 
 
Test of Hypotheses H1 and H2 
 Hypothesis H1 predicted a 2-way interaction between the personality variable 
agreeableness and the degree of interdependence within organizational units with the likelihood 
of utilizing an “Expand the Agenda” integrative negotiation strategy.  Table 2 presents the “Test 
of Between Subjects Effects” results of a 2X2X2 ANOVA run in SPSS.  Support for H1 would 
indicate the mean likelihood for participants in the HIGH interdependence condition who also 
exhibited HIGH levels of agreeableness were significantly less likely to pursue an expand the 
agenda negotiation strategy than other participants.   
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Results 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:   Expand 
PerfEval Interdep AGRSPL Mean Std. Dev N 
0 0 0 3.614286 .568205 14 
1 4.036364 .527774 11 
Total 3.800000 .580230 25 
1 0 3.925000 .692305 8 
1 3.214286 .480156 14 
Total 3.472727 .651870 22 
Total 0 3.727273 .618894 22 
1 3.576000 .643739 25 
Total 3.646809 .629993 47 
1 0 0 3.815385 .395487 13 
1 3.672727 .781141 11 
Total 3.750000 .593442 24 
1 0 3.766667 .416333 12 
1 3.563636 .697528 11 
Total 3.669565 .564426 23 
Total 0 3.792000 .397827 25 
1 3.618182 .724823 22 
Total 3.710638 .574545 47 
Total 0 0 3.711111 .494067 27 
1 3.854545 .676635 22 
Total 3.775510 .581138 49 
1 0 3.830000 .532225 20 
1 3.368000 .599110 25 
Total 3.573333 .609918 45 
Total 0 3.761702 .508430 47 
1 3.595745 .675650 47 
Total 3.678723 .600515 94 
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Table 2 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   Expand 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 5.452a 7 .779 2.385 .028 .163 16.694 .832 
Intercept 1250.861 1 1250.861 3830.220 .000 .978 3830.220 1.000 
PerfEval .001 1 .001 .004 .953 .000 .004 .050 
Interdep .639 1 .639 1.956 .165 .022 1.956 .282 
AGRSPL .574 1 .574 1.758 .188 .020 1.758 .259 
PerfEval * Interdep .178 1 .178 .546 .462 .006 .546 .113 
PerfEval * AGRSPL .005 1 .005 .014 .905 .000 .014 .052 
Interdep * AGRSPL 2.031 1 2.031 6.220 .015 .067 6.220 .694 
PerfEval * Interdep * 
AGRSPL 
1.641 1 1.641 5.025 .028 .055 5.025 .601 
Error 28.086 86 .327      
Total 1305.640 94       
Corrected Total 33.537 93       
a. R Squared = .163 (Adjusted R Squared = .094) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Variable Definitions 
Expand:  Dependent variable representing intent to use an Expand the Agenda negotiation strategy 
PerfEval:  Categorical variable representing level of budget focus in manager performance evaluation (0 = low; 1 = high) 
Interdep:  Categorical variable representing level of interdependence between organizational units (0 = low; 1 = high) 
AGRSPL:  Categorical variable representing a median split of the Agreeableness personality dimension responses (0 = low; 1 = high) 
PerfEval * Interdep:  Interaction term representing interaction of Performance Evaluation and Interdependence variables 
PerfEval *  AGRSPL:  Interaction term representing interaction of the Performance Evaluation and Agreeableness variables 
Interdep * AGRSPL:  Interaction term representing interaction of the Interdependence and Agreeableness variables 
PerfEal * Interdep * AGRSPL:  Interaction term representing three-way interaction between Performance Evaluation, 
Interdependence, and Agreeableness 
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The ANOVA results indicate a significant interaction between the interdependence 
variable (Interdep) and the median-split Agreeableness variable (AGRSPL) with a p-value < .05 
(Sig reported at .015) and the overall effect size, the impact of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable, is moderate with a Partial Eta Squared, the proportion of the Sum of 
Squares-Effect and Sum of Squares-Error attributable to the effect (Cohen 1973) of .067.  
General rules of thumb for interpreting effect sizes, including eta-squared and partial eta-
squared, group effect sizes into three classifications:  around .01 is considered small, around .06 
is considered medium, and .14 is considered large (Cohen 2013).  The noncentrality parameter 
and observed power both attest to the power of the specific test to correctly reject a false null 
hypothesis (Koele 1982). 
H1 stipulated a negative impact from the interaction.  A review of the means for each cell 
support the directionality predicted.  Thus H1 is supported. 
 Hypothesis H2 predicted a 3-way interaction between interdependence, budget focus in 
performance evaluation (PerfEval), and agreeableness with a negative impact on intention to 
utilize expand the agenda negotiation strategy.  The three-way interaction term reported in Table 
2 indicates a statistically significant three-way interaction between the variables (p-value < .05; 
reported significance of .028).  The partial eta squared of .055 is a moderate effect size (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, and Aiken 2013). Thus H2 is supported. 
 However, a review of the 8 cell means in the 2X2X2 ANOVA shows a complex 
interaction between the three independent variables on the dependent variable which may 
warrant additional exploration.  Of the 8 cell means, the two lowest, indicating lowest intention 
to pursue an expand the agenda negotiation strategy, are the high performance evaluation/high 
interdependence/high agreeableness cell and the low performance evaluation/high 
interdependence/high agreeableness cell.  Intriguingly as noted in Table 1, the high performance 
evaluation/high interdependence/high agreeableness cell mean is greater than the low 
performance evaluation/high interdependence/high agreeableness cell mean (3.563636 compared 
to 3.214286). 
 
Test of Hypotheses H3 and H4 
 Hypothesis H3 predicted a two-way interaction between interdependence and 
agreeableness.  However Table 4 indicates no statistically significant interaction between these 
two variables.  Reported p-value is .444.  Therefore, hypothesis H3 is not supported. Hypothesis 
H4 predicted a three-way interaction between interdependence, budget focus in performance 
evaluation, and agreeableness with a positive impact on likelihood of using a problem solving 
negotiation strategy.  Table 4 indicates a statistically significant (p-value < .05, reported 
significance of .029) interaction.  The reported effect size is moderate (Partial Eta Squared of 
.054) (Cohen 1973).  The fields noncentrality parameter and observed power again report the 
power of the individual test, the probability of correctly rejecting a null hypothesis which is in 
fact false (Koele 1982).   
A review of the means for each condition suggests the effect is in the correct direction.  
Therefore, H4 is supported.  Additionally, while not a hypothesis of this study, a significant 
interaction between performance evaluation focus and organizational interdependence is 
reported. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:   ProbSolv 
PerfEval Interdep AGRSPL Mean Std. Deviation N 
0 0 0 3.842857 .628447 14 
1 4.163636 .488411 11 
Total 3.984000 .582866 25 
1 0 3.950000 .520988 8 
1 3.542857 .510978 14 
Total 3.690909 .540643 22 
Total 0 3.881818 .581162 22 
1 3.816000 .582866 25 
Total 3.846809 .576666 47 
1 0 0 3.753846 .643707 13 
1 3.909091 .836008 11 
Total 3.825000 .725468 24 
1 0 4.000000 .511682 12 
1 4.509091 .372705 11 
Total 4.243478 .511527 23 
Total 0 3.872000 .585605 25 
1 4.209091 .702315 22 
Total 4.029787 .658032 47 
Total 0 0 3.800000 .625115 27 
1 4.036364 .680718 22 
Total 3.906122 .654602 49 
1 0 3.980000 .502206 20 
1 3.968000 .662520 25 
Total 3.973333 .590223 45 
Total 0 3.876596 .577179 47 
1 4.000000 .664635 47 
Total 3.938298 .622189 94 
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Table 4 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:   ProbSolv 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 6.958a 7 .994 2.943 .008 .193 20.601 .913 
Intercept 1431.247 1 1431.247 4237.882 .000 .980 4237.882 1.000 
PerfEval .646 1 .646 1.912 .170 .022 1.912 .277 
Interdep .158 1 .158 .467 .496 .005 .467 .104 
AGRSPL .477 1 .477 1.411 .238 .016 1.411 .217 
PerfEval * Interdep 2.638 1 2.638 7.812 .006 .083 7.812 .789 
PerfEval * AGRSPL .804 1 .804 2.381 .126 .027 2.381 .332 
Interdep * AGRSPL .200 1 .200 .591 .444 .007 .591 .118 
PerfEval * Interdep * 
AGRSPL 
1.670 1 1.670 4.944 .029 .054 4.944 .594 
Error 29.045 86 .338      
Total 1493.960 94       
Corrected Total 36.002 93       
a. R Squared = .193 (Adjusted R Squared = .128) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Variable Definitions 
ProbSolv:  Dependent variable representing intent to use a Problem Solving negotiation strategy 
PerfEval:  Categorical variable representing level of budget focus in manager performance evaluation (0 = low; 1 = high) 
Interdep:  Categorical variable representing level of interdependence between organizational units (0 = low; 1 = high) 
AGRSPL:  Categorical variable representing a median split of the Agreeableness personality dimension responses (0 = low; 1 = high) 
PerfEval * Interdep:  Interaction term representing interaction of Performance Evaluation and Interdependence variables 
PerfEval *  AGRSPL:  Interaction term representing interaction of the Performance Evaluation and Agreeableness variables 
Interdep * AGRSPL:  Interaction term representing interaction of the Interdependence and Agreeableness variables 
PerfEal * Interdep * AGRSPL:  Interaction term representing three-way interaction between Performance Evaluation, 
Interdependence, and Agreeableness 
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 A review of the cell means reported in the descriptive statistics (Table 3) shows the cell 
mean for the high performance evaluation, high interdependence, and high agreeableness 
condition is the highest of all the cell means (4.509091).  This suggests the combination of these 
factors correlates with a greater intention to pursue a problem solving negotiation strategy 
 
Discussion and Limitations 
 This study hypothesized the personality dimension agreeableness would interact with 
organizational factors, specifically the degree of focus on meeting budget targets in a manager’s 
performance evaluation and the level of interdependence to affect the likelihood of pursuing an 
integrative negotiation strategy during budget negotiations.  Results of hypotheses tests generally 
support the predicted interactions.  Such interactions provide important insight for managers 
regarding how different individuals may approach sharing information in a budget negotiation.  
Specifically, the results suggest more agreeable individuals will be more likely to pursue 
negotiation strategies which work through the existing set of negotiation issues, seeking optimal 
tradeoffs (a problem solving strategy) when the organization’s units are interdependent and their 
own performance evaluation includes greater accountability for meeting budget targets.  
However, the results also suggest more agreeable individuals will be significantly less likely to 
bring new ideas into the budget negotiation (pursue an expand the agenda negotiation strategy) 
when their organization’s units possess a greater level of interdependence. 
 Such insights provide significant value to both practice and the academy.  Prior budget 
research suggests obtaining information to coordinate firm interdependencies is a primary reason 
firms involve subordinates in the budgeting process (Shields and Shields 1998).  The results of 
this study suggest both structural and behavioral factors affect the likelihood of achieving that 
desired result.  Thus, to achieve the intended outcomes for which unit managers were brought 
into the budgeting process, managers will need to tailor their approach to the negotiations to 
reflect both the specific circumstances of their firm and the individuality of the manager on the 
other side of the negotiation. 
 Specifically, the results of this study suggest the generally other-focused personality 
dimension agreeableness will interact with structural factors around the budgeting process in 
important ways which affect the amount of information provided by unit managers.  The results 
suggest these individuals do respond to increased accountability with greater information 
sharing.  However, greater awareness of the connectivity between organizational units seems to 
reduce their willingness to offer new ideas, but increases their willingness to work through issues 
already present.  So, while such managers in an organization with strong interdependencies 
might not readily offer new ideas (expand the agenda) to address issues like resource shortages, 
new revenue opportunities, and process bottlenecks, these results suggest they may offer greater 
information and insights to work through them (problem solving) when already on the 
negotiation table.  Therefore, being aware of how particular managers respond to institutional 
factors can help budget managers maximize the value of budget negotiations and ultimately help 
improve firm performance and profitability. 
 Additionally, the results of this study offer potentially potent counterpoints to major 
criticisms of the traditional budgeting process.  A core criticism of the “Beyond Budgeting” 
critique is that the use of budget targets for performance evaluation can create dysfunctional 
performance incentives (Libby and Lindsay 2010).  However, the results of this study suggest the 
greater salience created by higher accountability for meeting budget targets may be an important 
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component in eliciting greater information sharing.  Specifically, highly agreeable individuals 
express a greater intent to pursue a problem solving negotiation strategy in conditions of greater 
organizational interdependence when meeting budget targets is a core component of their 
performance evaluation.  Thus, rather than reducing the amount of information provided by 
participants, the greater salience and focus generated by making achieving budget targets part of 
the performance evaluation process appears to increase the amount of information offered. 
This work also provides several promising avenues for possible future research.  While 
this work focused on the personality dimension agreeableness, other personality dimensions may 
impact responses to budget negotiation as well.  Also, little focus in the extant literature around 
budget negotiation has been paid to the negotiation strategies employed by participants.  This 
work contributes to the broader budgeting literature by introducing a budgeting application of the 
theory developed in the generic negotiation literature and opens avenues for further development 
of this theory within the unique budgeting context.  Also, the three-way interaction between 
performance evaluation, interdependence, and agreeableness’ relationship with intention to 
pursue an expand the agenda negotiation strategy warrants further investigation. 
 Like all experimental studies, this study must be qualified with several limitations.  First, 
this study relied on participant responses to a role-play type case.  The responses are only 
generalizable to the extent that case elicited responses similar to those exhibited in an actual 
work environment.  No case can fully capture the richness and weight of an actual employment 
situation.  Secondly, the experiment drew participants from an online crowdsourcing 
marketplace (Amazon’s MTurk).  Again, the results of the study can only generalize to the extent 
this marketplace of participants can approximate actual subordinate managers’ responses. 
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